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Abstract This paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of mergers
and acquisitions (M&As) on the shape of the firm size distribution, by using
data of the population of manufacturing firms in the Netherlands. Our analysis
shows that M&As do not affect the size distribution when we consider the
entire population of firms. When we focus on the firms involved in an M&A
event, we observe a shift of the firm size distribution towards larger sizes. Firm
size distribution becomes more concentrated around the mean, less skewed to
the right hand side, and thinner at the tails as a whole. The shift toward higher
sizes due to M&A is not uniform but affects firms of different sizes in different
ways. While the number of firms in the lower tail decreased, the number of
firms in the central size classes increased substantially and outweighed the
increase in the number (and mean size) of firms in the upper tail of the dis-
tribution (consequently the overall market concentration measured by the
Herfindahl index declines). M&As lead to a departure from log-normality
of the firm size distribution, suggesting that external growth does not follow
Gibrat’s law. Our counterfactual analysis highlights that only internal growth
does not affect the shape of the size distribution of firms. On the contrary, it
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suggests that the change in the size distribution is almost entirely due to the
external growth of the firms.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies have repeatedly shown that firm size distributions in indus-
trial countries are highly skewed, or, in other words, that a small number
of large firms coexist with a large number of small firms. The firm size
distribution within an industry indicates the degree of industrial concentration
and therefore is of particular interest for antitrust policy.
Starting with Gibrat (1931), firm size has often been described by lognormal
distributions. Indeed, this distribution has been interpreted as the outcome
of the “Law of Proportionate Effects”, which predicts that firm size follows
a random walk and, hence, that the growth of firms is erratic and independent
of size. (For a survey see Sutton 1997; and Bottazzi et al. 2002) Gibrat’s Law
was originally used as an explanation of the highly skewed distribution of
firm size and it has become, both empirically and theoretically, a benchmark
for discussing the processes of firm growth (McCloughan 1995; Geroski 1999;
Lotti and Santarelli 2004; Cefis et al. 2007). Recently, Luttmer (2007) and
Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) have proposed different theoretical models that,
deviating from Gibrat’s Law, are able to explain internal firm growth giving,
as an outcome, size distributions that are consistent with salient features of the
observed firm size distributions.
The upper tail of these highly skewed size distributions has often been
described by the Yule or Pareto (also known as “Power Law”) distributions. If
a discrete random variable, such as firm size, is Pareto-distributed, it means
that the frequency of the variable above a certain threshold is inversely
proportional to the value of the variable. In the case of firm size, the Power
Law predicts that the frequency of firms above a certain size (or a minimum
size) is inversely proportional to firm size.
Several studies in industrial economics have empirically tested whether firm
size is Pareto-distributed and have formulated models able to generate Pareto-
like distributions (e.g. Ijiri and Simon 1974). If firm size is distributed according
to a Pareto distribution, the coefficient of the distribution (the slope of the
Pareto curve) is a measure of the degree to which business is concentrated
in the larger firms in an industry or an economy, expressing the percentage
of observations in the upper tail of the distribution. Furthermore, if Pareto
distributed and with slope parameter within a certain range, the industrial
structure would depend only on the interaction between firms and not on
external factors or individual firm behaviour (Krugman 1996)
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Despite the vast literature that has investigated the firm size distribution—
some of which will be discussed below—little attention has been devoted to
the underlying form of firm growth, and in particular to the effects of internal
firm expansion and of external firm growth.
The external firm growth, due to mergers and acquisitions (M&As), may be
of significance if the incidence (and/or size) of M&As were not neutral with
respect to the firm size. For example, suppose that merger-initiating firms (i.e.
acquiring firms) are more ubiquitous in larger size classes. If such mergers are
more effective in gaining size than would be the case with growth by internal
expansion (which, in the short run, is obviously true) and sustainable (in the
sense that they do not have to be broken up soon after initiation because
of failures), then—ceteris paribus—we would expect a systematically higher
growth rate in the upper tails of the size distribution. Growth, in other words,
would then be dependent on firm size.
Also, it is important to note that the variance of a distribution is a measure
of inequality, not concentration (Hannah and Kay 1981). Thus, trends in
inequality and concentration will be similar if the number of firms remains
constant, but when this latter number declines, concentration will increase
while—depending on the size of acquired firms—the degree of inequality
may rise as well as fall. Since mergers necessarily imply such a decline,
concentration through merger may or may not increase inequality, whereas
inequality will increase when concentration increases through internal growth.
That this concerns non-trivial questions is shown by the dramatic rise in
M&As during the second half of the 1990s (see Fig. 1). In fact, this so-called
fifth merger wave exceeded everything that went on before, both in numbers
and in deal value. During 1996–2000, more than $12,000 billion was spent on
mergers, $9,000 billion of which by firms from Europe and the USA.
Among large firms, merger is also the most important cause of disappear-
ance, especially in Europe and the USA (see Table 1). Among the US and the
European Union’s (EU’s) 100 largest manufacturing firms, 30 were absorbed
into another member of this size group within a 15-year period. In total,
15% of large firms disappeared through merger, except in Japan where large
Fig. 1 M&As by total
transaction value (trn US$).
Source: Schenk (2003)
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Table 1 Disposition of the Triad’s largest manufacturers of 1978 with respect to 1993
USA EU Japan
Liquidated 0 1 0
Demerged 0 2 0
Surpasseda 21 21 18
Survived 58 57 78
Acquired(remaining in top-100) 14 16 4
Otherb 7 3 0
Total 100 100 100
In percentages; with respect to top-100 firms of each respective region. Note that the period does
not cover the massive merger movement in the second half of the 1990s.
aFirms that dropped out of the top-100; no further information as to their disposition available
bFirms that dropped out of the top-100 because of reclassification to another sector (mainly
services)
Source: Schenk (1997)
firms apparently are much less active in mergers. Evidently, extending the
population to smaller size categories will increase the percentage of merger
disappearances. For example, of the 3,011 firms quoted on the London Stock
Exchange in 1950, no less than 1,265 (or 42%) appear to have been taken over
by 1977 (Odagiri 1992).
The purpose of the paper is, therefore, to analyze the effects of M&As on
the firm size distribution and on concentration proxies. The aim is to supply
new empirical evidence on a topic scarcely investigated. The research is meant
to be a first step in the analysis of the firm’s growth process when considering
not merely internal growth (i.e. growth due to the internal capacities to expand
in terms of total sales or number of employees) but also external growth (i.e.
growth due to M&As).
In Section 2, we discuss some crucial results previously obtained in the
literature. Section 3 describes the database and the variables under scrutiny. In
Section 4, we examine the evidence on the aggregate size distributions, while
in Section 5, we consider only the size distribution of firms involved in a merger
and/or an acquisition. Section 6 discusses the results of the counterfactual
analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review and discussion
The increasing importance of large firms is hardly contested. Indeed, the data
throughout the previous century, perhaps excluding the 1930s through to the
1950s, show increasing aggregate concentration in manufacturing, mining and
distribution for most European countries well into the 1990s, the Netherlands
included (Schenk 1997). Data on the U.S. reveals an undulating pattern of
aggregate concentration until the early 1990s, after which it rises sharply (Pryor
2001). Such increasing dominance can result from stochastic processes, or can
be the inevitable result of modern technology and large-scale production. In
all cases, however, it can be carried by M&As.
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Ijiri and Simon (1971) was the first of only a small number of empirical stud-
ies focusing on the effects of M&As on the firm size distribution.1 Comparing
firm size distributions in 1956 and in 1957 in a sample of large American firms,
Ijiri and Simon tested the effects of M&As on the concentration measure β
(the slope of the Pareto curve). Their results suggested that M&As do not
greatly affect β, a conclusion that has long remained a prime source of refer-
ence no matter how counterintuitive. Furthermore, Ijiri and Simon proposed
that, during the 1950s and 1960s, the size distribution of the 500 largest firms
remained relatively unchanged. Any growth of the firms in question then takes
the form of a parallel upward shift in the (partial) firm size distribution, the
degree of shift depending on the growth rate that is applicable to all firms in
the relevant population, regardless of size. Their analysis thus supports the
proposition that firm growth due to M&As would follow Gibrat’s Law to the
same extent as would internal growth.2
However, these results may have been biased because the mid-1950s wit-
ness an exceptionally low merger incidence. Thus, comparing the firm size
distribution of 1957 with that of 1956 would not lead one to expect to find
significant differences, if any. Similarly, and despite Ijiri and Simon’s claims to
the contrary, M&As only appeared to catch on in the late 1960s (starting what
would later become known as the third merger wave; see Blair 1972), so that
it would not be surprising to find that the size distribution of the top-500 firms
did not change much from the early 1950s through to the mid 1960s.
Indeed, in their later work, Ijiri and Simon (1974) modified their earlier
conclusions. Studying the 831 largest industrial firms according to the annual
Fortune rankings for 1969, they found a firm size distribution that departed
significantly from the straight-line Pareto curve. Two potential explanations
were subsequently investigated, one of which concerned the effect of M&As.3
They first grouped the 831 firms into nine size classes, and then observed the
number of firms that were involved in mergers during the 20 preceding years,
classifying these by (a) the post-merger size of the combined firms; (b) the pre-
merger size of acquiring firms; and (c) the pre-merger size of acquired firms.
The estimated number of firms if mergers are eliminated, then, was given by
calculating over the size classes the number of 1969-firms minus the numbers
classified as (a), plus those classified as (b) and (c). It turned out that 1,002 firms
would have existed in 1969 instead of the actually observed 831 firms, and that
the rate of disappearance due to merger was not independent of the size class,
in the sense that smaller firms had a higher chance of being absorbed. A similar
exercise involving assets produced a series of merger-free asset data by size
1In this paper, we do not distinguish between merger, on the one hand, and acquisition or takeover,
on the other. All three terms will be used interchangeably.
2Notice that Ijiri and Simon (1971), contrary to common parlance, defined internal growth as
growth due to mergers and acquisitions and external growth as growth due to growth from sources
outside the population.
3Ijiri and Simon (1974) also studied a model in which a firm with a history of recent growth had a
better chance for further growth than a firm of the same size the growth of which had taken place
in the distant past. It appeared plausible and also found empirical support.
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class. Growth by assets as a result of merger appeared to be dependent on size
class as well, in the sense that, without mergers, the total of assets present in the
smaller size classes would have been higher than actually observed, whereas in
the larger size classes, it would have been smaller than actually observed.4 By
plotting the actual data and the estimated data against the theoretical size-
rank relationship (the Pareto curve), Ijiri and Simon were able to confirm that
M&As had contributed appreciably to increasing the concentration measure
and the concavity of the firm size distribution, i.e. a departure from the Pareto
expectation. It is worth noticing that by far most of the increases in size-growth
disparities were observed during the last few years of the period studied, i.e.
when the third merger wave caught momentum.
Following somewhat different methodologies, but essentially retaining the
idea of composing hypothetical ‘merger-free’ populations for comparison,
other researchers have come up with similar results. Singh (1975) found that,
from the second quintile upwards, the probability of being acquired declines
monotonically with size, moderately at first but more sharply once the top size
classes are reached. Similarly, Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975) reinforced the
finding that, among large companies, size and the probability of acquisition
are inversely related. Among the smallest of size classes, the disappearance
rate due to merger over a 12-year period was 40.4%, after which it declined
systematically with increasing size, ultimately reaching 21.1% and 26.3% in
the highest size classes. Other things being equal, this suggests that smaller
firms disappear as bigger firms acquire them, while some bigger firms disappear
because they merge among themselves, thus creating a size-stronger segment
in the upper tails of the distribution.
According to Hannah and Kay (1977), the effects of merger on growth are
so strong, that without mergers, smaller firms would have grown faster than
larger firms.5 They studied two populations, one of which concerned all quoted
firms in manufacturing operating in the UK with 1957-assets in excess of £
1 million. By carefully dissecting the sources of concentration growth, they
conclude that, without mergers, (aggregate) concentration would not have
increased much, and certainly not as much as it did during the 1957–1976
period they study. For the period 1957–1969, it was only the fact that the
internal growth of large and merging firms was below the average of their
population as a whole that prevented concentration from being higher than it
already was. Interestingly, Hannah and Kay’s study would suggest that, rather
than attributing any departures from the Pareto curve to the effect of mergers,
it is the influence of mergers that is to be held responsible for the Law of
Proportionate Effect to hold, if it holds. First, if there were no mergers, the
higher degree of diversification that is so characteristic of large firms would
lead to a lower degree of dispersion of growth rates. Second, the feasibility
4Notice that the population involves large firms only.
5This assumes that there is no trade-off between internal and external growth, in the sense that it
is assumed that firms would not have generated more internal growth if, for some reason, they had
not focused on external growth.
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of an acquisition in terms of size will be dependent on the existing size of the
acquiring firm. Merger, according to Hannah and Kay, is almost always the
principal contributor to the variance of the growth of firms, since merger is
behind most cases of outstandingly rapid growth.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, this paper applies an
extensive dataset of the entire population of Dutch manufacturing firms (and
not only quoted or large firms), including entries and exits, to the study of the
effects of M&As on the shape of the firm size distribution. Second, it attempts
to disentangle the effects of internal and external growth processes on the size
distribution by means of a counterfactual analysis.
3 Data and methodology
We use two databases of manufacturing firms in the Netherlands collected by
the Central Bureau of Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The first database is the
Business Register (BR), a comprehensive database of the entire population
of manufacturing firms. It contains demographic and domestic employment
data of all firms registered for fiscal purposes in the Netherlands over the
period 1993–1999. For a given year, the dataset includes all firms that had been
active during that year, not necessarily for the full duration of that year. The
set is composed of all firms that existed throughout the year and of all those
that entered and/or exited during the year. Here, the events ‘entry’ and ‘exit’
are defined with respect to the inclusion in or exclusion from the dataset. In
addition, the dataset specifies the reason for inclusion or exclusion of a firm.
The particular variable allows distinguishing actual entry and exit of a firm
from the entries and exits due to M&As. Because of this identification and
of the comprehensive scope of the dataset, (actual) entry and (actual) exit
as reported in the BR provide very good approximations of the birth and
death of a company. As a measure of size, we use the number of domestic
employees, as this is the only measure available in the dataset. In this respect,
the BR has the advantage of reporting the firm size down to zero employees
(or self-employment).
The second database provides additional information beyond that in the
BR. It contains detailed information on all domestic M&As that took place
within the observed population of firms from the BR. In particular, it allows
matching the acquired (or merged) firms to the acquiring (or merging) firms,
and the corresponding number of employees. From now on, we refer to an
“event” whenever a merger, takeover or partial acquisition takes place, on
the one hand; and, on the other, whenever restructuring of the company
in different units, or via spin-offs and partial divestures takes place (partial
acquisitions and divestitures are recorded only if they concern ownership
changes beyond 50% of total outstanding shares).
Combining the two datasets, we have estimated two distributions: (a) the
‘starting distribution’ that one would observe at the beginning of the year,
before any event had taken place; and (b) the ‘final distribution’ that one
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observes at the end of the year, after all events have taken place. The firms that
carry out acquisitions (including partial acquisitions) or divestitures (including
partial divestitures) appear in the starting distribution with their size before
any event takes place. In the final distribution, they appear with their size
modified according to the events that took place, i.e. in case of a merger or
an acquisition with an increased size, while in case of a divestiture with a
decreased size.
For a certain year, the ‘starting distribution’ is composed of four categories:
(1) the firms that will not undergo any event throughout the year; (2) the firms
that will exit during the year; (3) the firms that will be acquired or merged; and
(4) the firms that will acquire or undertake partial divestiture. For the same
year, the ‘final distribution’ comprises the following sets: (1) firms that will
not have undergone any event during the year (so-called continuing firms);
(2) firms that have entered during the year; (3) firms that have been spun-off
or demerged from existing firms; and (4) firms that have done acquisitions or
that have undertaken (partial) divestitures.
In addition, to distinguish better the effects of M&A on the size distribution,
we compare the starting and final state for the entire population—that is, as a
result of (1) + (2) + (3) + (4)—as well as for the only set of firms involved in
the process of M&As—that is, (3) and (4).
As a reference year for the starting and final distributions, we consider
the year 1997, since this is the year in which the greatest number of events
related to M&As took place over the observation period, 1993–1999. In 1997,
the population of manufacturing firms from the Business Register includes
62,662 firms, of which slightly less than 10% are firms with zero employees
(self-employment). Therefore, we compare the distribution that includes the
firms with zero employees with the distribution that excludes these firms.
4 The aggregate size distribution
We first analyze the size distribution for the entire population of firms for 1997.
We estimate the starting and final distributions for the population, including
and excluding self-employment. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for
the four distributions.
The number of active firms in the starting distribution amounts to 57,329,
of which 9.7% are firms with zero employees (self-employment). The same
number for the final distribution is equal to 56,595, of which 8.8 are self-
employed. A comparison of the starting and the final distribution shows that
the number of firms decreases by 1.3% when self-employment is included,
and with 0.2% when it is excluded. This suggests that the self-employed are
suffering the highest mortality rate.
Our estimated distributions, no matter whether we are concerned with the
starting or final distribution, either with or without self-employment, are in
line with previous findings on empirical size distributions. Seventy-five percent
of the distribution consists of firms with less that ten employees, confirming
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the starting and final distribution of the firm population in 1997
Including self-employment Excluding self-employment
Starting Final Starting Final
distribution distribution distribution distribution
Number of firms 57,329 56,595 51,740 51,633
Mean number of employees 16.9 17.0 18.7 18.6
SD 185.5 181.8 195.1 190.2
Coff. variation 1,096.5 1,069.0 1,041.3 1,020.7
Skewness 137.2 137.6 130.5 131.6
Kurtosis 25,789.3 25,885.0 23,312.0 23,650.7
Quantiles
0% 0 0 1 1
1% 0 0 1 1
5% 0 0 1 1
10% 1 1 1 1
25% 1 1 1 1
50% 2 2 3 2
75% 7 7 9 9
90% 25 25 27 27
95% 52 53 59 59
99% 238 245 261 267
the “stylized fact” that size distributions are highly positively skewed: large
numbers of small sized firms and small numbers of large firms. Indeed, only
about 1% of the population has more than 230 employees. In addition, the
mean of the distribution is between eight and nine times larger than the
median, due to the long right tail (confirmed by the large kurtosis) given
the presence of only a few large firms.
To compare graphically the size distributions of the starting and final
populations, we plot the right cumulative distribution function on a double
logarithmic scale (Fig. 2a) and the probability density function (Fig. 2b).
Because of the logarithmic scale, we analyze only the distributions without
self-employment.6
In Fig. 2a, b, the plots of the starting and final distribution largely overlap,
thus demonstrating that the firm size distribution seems to be unaffected by
events, among which are M&As. Since 1997 was well into the fifth merger
wave (see Fig. 1), and Dutch firms were among the world’s most active in
terms of M&As, this would seem to be a puzzling result. However, a number
of possible explanations can be brought forward. First, the dynamics of the
entire manufacturing sector may counterbalance the effects of M&As on the
size distribution. In this case, we would assume that greenfield entrants (8.13%
of the population) as wells as the firms that exit the market (7.09% of the
population) offset the effects of M&As on the size distributions.
6However, this restriction would not affect the analysis of the size distribution, since, as we
observed in Table 2, the two distributions, with and without self-employment, have the same
characteristic features.
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Fig. 2 Size distribution of all
firms including M&As in
1997. a Cumulative
distribution function.
b Probability density function
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Second, our analysis focuses on the population of manufacturing firms that
are active in the Netherlands, and on events related to M&As that have
involved these firms only, excluding events that took place abroad. In other
words, we study the effects of M&As on the firm size distribution as far as
these firms have manufacturing facilities inside a country, in this case, the
Netherlands. Especially during the last merger wave that ran from 1995–
2000, many M&As were cross-border, especially those involving large and
very large firms. Dutch firms were particularly active in the international
merger market. For example, in 1998, and in relation to home country gross
domestic product (GDP), Dutch firms took the world’s number one position
in terms of cross-border M&As. Such mergers amounted to approximately
11.1% of GDP, whereas cross-border M&As involving French and German
firms amounted to only 3.4% and 3.3% of GDP, respectively (Schenk 2003).
Therefore, even merger frenzies may leave domestic firm size distributions—
as well as industrial concentration—unaffected, provided that the implied
mergers are cross-border. Obviously, such mergers may have a significant
effect on the firm size distribution as well as industrial concentration at the
EU and/or the worldwide level.
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Finally, our analysis focuses on the effects of M&As on the size distribution
at the aggregate level, pooling together all manufacturing sectors. Thus, the
result that no significant change of the firm size distribution has been detected
may be due to aggregation. An increasing industrial concentration due to
M&As in one specific sector (at two or three digit level of the Standard
Industrial Classification) might be compensated by a decreasing concentration
in another. Therefore, aggregation could have washed away the effects of
M&As on industrial concentration.
In order to test whether the differences between the two distributions are
statistically significant, we run a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test. The results shown
in Table 3 allow us to reject the hypothesis that the two empirical distributions
come from the same theoretical distribution. Despite the graphical analysis,
the statistical test detects the effects of the M&As on the size distribution.
Indeed, we know that about 3,000 firms are involved in such processes. As the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov is a sensitive test for a large number of observations, it
is able to capture an effect that the graphical analysis neglects.
We calculate the Herfindahl index for the starting and final distributions
in order to assess whether the degree of industrial concentration changes as
an effect of industrial dynamics. Defining N the number of the firms in the
distribution (the industry of interest), si the size of firm i and fi the market
share of firm i, the Herfindahl index is given by
H =
N∑
i=1
f 2i
where
fi = siN∑
i=1
si
The index ranges from the Min(H ) = 1/N to the Max(H ) = 1. Therefore,
the minimum value of the index depends on the number of the firms in the
distribution.
In order to avoid such shortcoming and to enable comparisons between
the indexes calculated on different distributions with different numbers of
Table 3 Kolmogorov–Smirnov two-sample test (asymptotic)
Starting Final KS D KSa Pr> KSa
distribution distribution
(N) (N)
All firms: including 57,329.00 56,595.00 0.00 0.01 1.66 0.01
those with zero employees
All firms: excluding those 51,740.00 51,633.00 0.01 0.02 2.44 <.0001
with zero employees
Only firms involved in M&A: 3,899.00 2,564.00 0.13 0.26 10.17 <.0001
including those with
zero employees
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observations, we calculate the relative measure of concentration H* that
normalizes for the number of firms in the distribution. Namely,
H∗ = H − Min (H )
Max (H ) − Min (H ) =
H − 1/N
1 − 1/N (1)
with Min(H*) = 0 and Max(H*) = 1
It holds that:
H∗ = N
2
N − 1 V (2)
where V is the variance of firms market shares
V =
∑ (
fi − 1
/
N
)2
N
For the starting distribution, the normalized Herfindahl index is 0.002115
and for the final distribution 0.002037. The result suggests that, in 1997, the
industrial dynamics slightly reduced the degree of the domestic industrial
concentration.
This counterintuitive result could be explained by observing that the in-
crease in the density of the medium-sized firms outweighs the increase in
the density of the upper tails of the distribution. Taking into account Eq. 2,
we can notice that, as the number of firms in the distribution decreases (as
happened from the starting to the final distribution in 1997, that is, from 57,329
to 56,595) and keeping constant the variance of the distribution, the value of
the normalized Herfindahl index decreases. In order to have an increase of
the Herfindahl index, we should observe an increase of the variance of the
distribution that offsets the decrease due to the reduction in the number of
firms. This is what usually happens when the majority of the M&As takes
place among large firms, giving rise to even larger or gigantic firms. In our case,
instead, we consider what happens to the distribution of the entire population
of firms due to the M&As events among all classes. What we observe in our
data is that the density of the distribution significantly increases around the
mean of the distribution, and the variance of the distribution decreases for the
effects of the M&As (from 3.7 × 10−9 to 3.6 × 10−9), enhancing the effects
of the reduction of the number of firms. As a result, the Herfindahl index
decreases.
Finally, to investigate the shape of the size distribution, and the effects
of industrial dynamics, we present the p–p plots for the starting and final
distributions both for the lognormal and Pareto. Figure 3 shows that the
lognormal distribution fits the data better than the Pareto distribution. This is
not surprising because we know from the literature that the Pareto distribution
fits better the upper tail of the firm size distribution (Marsili 2005; Cabral and
Mata 2003). As observed for the density and cumulative distribution graphs,
the differences in the shape between the starting and the final distributions
cannot be visually appreciated.
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Fig. 3 Lognormal (left) and Pareto (right) p–p plots for the starting and final distributions of firm
size (entire population)
5 The effects of mergers and acquisitions
In this section, we focus on the set of firms that are involved in an M&A
event during the year 1997. In this way, we try to emphasize the possible
effects of M&As on the shape of the size distribution. The starting distribution
represents the initial (at the beginning of the year) size of the firms that we
know will be involved in an event during the year. The final distribution collects
the size of the same firms after the event took place. Furthermore, in the final
distribution, the new firms created by spin-offs, divestures and restructuring
appear, while firms that exited the market due to mergers or takeovers are no
longer present.
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During 1997, 3,899 firms were involved in activities related to M&As and
their spin-offs and divestures. At the end of the year, 2,564 firms remained,
which suggests that M&As, spin-offs, and divestitures have decreased the
numbers of firms active in the manufacturing sector. The descriptive statistics
shown in Table 4 highlight that this is not the only effect. The average firm
size increases by 56%, while the median increases by 100%. Looking at the
quintiles of the two distributions (the one at the beginning of the year and
the one at the end, after all events had occurred), one could conclude that the
entire starting distribution shifts towards larger sizes
It is worth noting that the skewness, the kurtosis and also the coefficient
of variation considerably decrease from the starting to the final distribution,
suggesting that the final distribution is more symmetric and more concentrated
around its mean.
As Fig. 4 confirms, there are more firms concentrated in the central part
of the distribution. Indeed, the density increases drastically at the center,
and marginally in the upper tail. This increase is due to a large reduction
in the density of firms in the lower tail (see Fig. 4b). Overall, we observe
that the effect of M&As increases significantly the number of medium-sized
firms, reducing the number of the micro and small firms, while the number of
large firms does not increase in such a relevant way, but their size increases
considerably (see the quantiles at 95% and 99% in Table 4: the values almost
double).
In accordance with the graphical analysis, the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test
in Table 3 shows that the empirical distributions before and after the M&A
events come from two distinct theoretical distributions.
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the number of employees of the firms involved in events during
1997
Including those with zero employees
Starting distribution Final distribution
Number of firms 3,899 2,564
Mean 36.33 55.67
SD 621.16 748.85
Coff. variation 1,709.70 1,345.23
Skewness 52.48 42.54
Kurtosis 3,003.15 1,973.80
Quantiles
0% 0 0
1% 0 0
5% 0 2
10% 0 4
25% 2 8
50% 7 14
75% 15 21
90% 27 45
95% 64 122
99% 350 579
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Fig. 4 Size distribution
of firms involved in M&As
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b Probability density function
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
size
f(x
)
Starting Final
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000
Employment
Ri
gh
t C
um
ula
tiv
e 
Di
str
ibu
tio
n 
Fu
nc
tio
n
Starting distribution Final distribution
a
b
As before, we calculate the Herfindahl index of the starting and final
distributions in order to measure the changes in industrial concentration due
to the effects of M&As. For the starting distribution, the Herfindahl index is
0.07673, while it is 0.07207 for the final distribution.7
As with for the entire population, industrial concentration decreases as an
effect of M&As but for a different composition of effects with respect to the
entire population. The density of the distribution significantly increases around
the mean of the distribution, but, in this case, the variance of the distribution
increases for the effects of the M&As (from 2.0 × 10−6 to 2.8 × 10−6), but
not enough to offset the effects of the reduction of the number of firms. As a
result, also in this case, the Herfindahl index decreases. This is consistent with
the decline of the coefficient of variation from the starting distribution to the
final distribution, both in the entire population and in the sample considering
only firms involved in M&A events.
Another way to study the effects of M&As on the shape of the size
distribution is to look at the p–p plots. Figure 5 reports the p–p plots for the
7As before, the measure of concentration has been calculated using a relative measure that
normalizes for the number of firms in the distribution.
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Lognormal P-P Plot of Starting distribution
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Fig. 5 Lognormal (left) and Pareto (right) p–p plots for the starting and final size distributions for
only firms involved in M&A
lognormal and Pareto. Again, the Pareto shows a poor fit to the data, while
the lognormal seems to provide a better fit. If we focus on the lognormal p–p
plot of the final distribution, we can observe that the M&As induce a greater
departure from log-normality than the starting distribution. This suggests that
the process of external growth due to M&As is not generated by Gibrat’s
process.
6 Counterfactual analysis
The differences previously observed between the starting and the final dis-
tributions reflect organic or internal growth of the firm as well as growth
due to M&As (external growth). In order to disentangle the effects given by
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internal and external growth, we perform a counterfactual analysis. The aim is
to compare the real final distribution of firms that underwent an M&A event
(including any internal growth as well as external growth) with the distribution
of the same firms, assuming that they experienced only internal growth.
The computation of the counterfactual distribution builds on the following
steps. First, the actual growth rates between the years 1997 and 1998 for the
firms that are not involved in an M&A event are calculated. From this distri-
bution of actual growth rates, a random sample was extracted of dimension
equal to the number of firms involved in M&A. By applying these random
values to the initial size of firms involved in an M&A event, we derive the final
size of these same firms, had they not been involved in M&As. The actual final
size of firms involved in M&A and the imputed final size of those that were
involved in M&A define the final distribution of firm size that would result
from internal growth only.
The counterfactual analysis (see Fig. 6a) suggests that M&As do affect the
firm size distribution, especially among medium sized firms: indeed, the density
of the M&A-firms is much above the counterfactual in the central part of the
distribution, meaning that M&As create a large number of medium sized firms.
The upper tail is less affected by M&As than is the lower tail. The number of
large firms slightly rises, but, above all, the size of very few large firms increases
as an effect of M&A. In fact, Fig. 6a shows a longer and slightly thicker upper
tail of the final distribution than the counterfactual distribution. However, the
dynamics that we observe among the largest firms is limited in number in
Fig. 6 Counterfactual
analysis. a Real final
distribution versus the
counterfactual distribution
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M&As). b The effects of only
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comparison to the dynamics of the small and medium sized firms. The total
effect of M&As is that industrial concentration, as measured by the normalized
Herfindahl index, is higher in the counterfactual distributions (H = 0.0965)
than in the actual final distribution (H = 0.07027). This is mainly because, in
the final distribution, the number of firms with size around the mean increases
considerably at the expense of micro and small firms. This variation largely
outweighs the increase in number and average size of very few large firms and
makes the concentration index decrease.
Figure 6b shows that only internal growth does not affect the shape of the
size distribution of firms. Indeed, the starting and counterfactual distributions
are hardly distinguishable in the graph. On the contrary, the counterfactual
analysis suggests that the change in the size distribution is almost entirely due
to the external growth of the firms.
7 Conclusions
As pointed out by Scherer (2002), the process of M&As plays an important
role in shaping market concentration. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on
how this process influences the shape of the firm size distribution is limited
and somewhat inconclusive. This paper provides new empirical evidence on
the effects of M&As on the shape of the size distribution of firms, by using
data from the Business Register of the population of manufacturing firms in
the Netherlands.
Our analysis shows that M&As do not affect the size distribution when we
consider the entire population of firms. This may depend on a number of facts:
that entries and exits may balance the effects of M&As, that the distribution
may aggregate opposite effects at the sector level, and that international
M&As, which are excluded from the dataset, may have the most apparent
effect on the overall population because they tend to involve the largest
firms.
The effects of M&A on the shape of the size distribution emerge when we
focus on the firms that were involved in a merger or acquisition event in the
observed period. First of all, we observed a shift of the firm size distribution
towards larger sizes, with a considerable increase in both the mean and median
of firm size. At first glance, this is consistent with what Ijiri and Simon (1971)
originally noted in their study of US largest firms in the 1950s and early 1960s.
They found that M&As produced an upward shift in the Pareto curve, which,
however, left the shape of the distribution–and therefore market concentration
as measured by the slope of the Pareto curve—largely unchanged. Ijiri and
Simon’s interpretation was that the size distribution was relatively invariant to
the process of M&As, because all firms grew roughly in the same proportion
as an it.
Our analysis of the higher central moments of the distribution allowed us
to qualify such a shift in firm size and provided evidence that the shape of
the distribution did change per effect of M&As (in contrast with the results
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of the 1971 study by Ijiri and Simon). Indeed, we found that the firm size
distribution becomes more concentrated around the mean, less skewed to the
right hand side, and thinner at the tails as a whole. In addition, the graphical
inspection of the density functions revealed that the shift toward higher sizes
due to M&A is not uniform but affects firms of different sizes in different ways.
While the number of firms in the lower tail decreased, as expected, the number
of firms in the central size classes increased substantially and outweighed
the increase in the number (and mean size) of firms in the upper tail of the
distribution.
In sum, we observe increasing concentration of firms around the average
size, which seems to counterbalance the observed increase in firm size in the
upper tail of the size distribution as an effect of M&As (consequently the
overall market concentration measured by the normalized Herfindahl index
declines). These findings are consistent with the results of a later work by Ijiri
and Simon (1974) in which they revised their earlier conclusions, on the basis
of data from the late 1960s; during this period a larger number of M&As took
place than in the 1950s and early 1960s. Ijiri and Simon (1974) observed an
increase in concavity in size distribution—compared to the straight line of the
Pareto law-when the number of M&As picked up. The increase in concavity
implies that the number of firms in the center of the distribution increases,
which is consistent with our results.
Another aspect is the implications on Gibrat’s law. Firms disappear both at
the bottom of the distribution and somewhere in the middle-high range. The
probability of experiencing an M&A is not uniform over the size range. This
process leads to a change in the shape of the size distribution and to a departure
from log-normality. The departure from the lognormal is more evident for
the firms involved in M&As than for the total population. This suggests that
external growth does not follow Gibrat’s law, and even more so than in the
overall population. Small firms are more likely to be acquired, while the larger
are more likely to merge (Singh 1975).
Our counterfactual analysis highlights the idea that only internal growth
does not affect the shape of the size distribution of firms. On the contrary,
it suggests that the change in the size distribution is almost entirely due to the
external growth of the firms. More research is needed here, on the relationship
between firm growth rates and different form of growth, internal and external.
Our analysis is limited to the effects that M&As in a certain year had on the
firm size distribution in aggregate manufacturing. As possible extensions of the
current research, it would be interesting to see whether the effects of M&As
that we observed are invariant or not over time and across industrial sectors.
One could then examine the evolution of the effects of M&As on the firm size
distribution over time at the economy wide level and at the disaggregated level
of sectors.
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